Farrell and Shapiro proposed a simple test of the possible upward pricing pressure (UPP) following a merger. They showed that the test may give false negatives, that is, indicate that a merger may not give an UPP, while a more comprehensive test would indicate the opposite.
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust authorities receive a large number of merger notifications. Since they cannot scrutinize all mergers in detail, they need simple tools for accepting mergers that are not expected to have anti-competitive effects. Market shares and concentration ratios have traditionally been used as indicators. As explained in an article by Joe Farrell and Carl Shapiro (hereafter FS) these measures may be inaccurate in differentiated products' industries.
1 FS proposed an alternative screening tool called UPP (Upward Pricing Pressure)
focusing directly on the merged firms' incentives to raise post-merger prices. The test requires limited information, in particular it does not require demand or competitor data, it is based on sound economic logic, and it is an improvement compared to the detailed focus on market definition at present.
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When a screen test gives a negative result, the merger will be cleared. A simple tool may err, however. It may indicate anti-competitive effects when there would be none, i.e., a false positive result, or predict no price increase when the opposite would be true, which is a false negative result. If the screening leads to a false negative, one would clear a merger that should have been banned. This mistake will not be corrected later on. A false positive result, however, may be corrected in the subsequent and more detailed process. One should therefore be more concerned about false negatives than false positives.
FS show that for symmetric firms the proposed UPP may lead to false negatives, but never false positives. We show that with asymmetric firms false positives may result and is more likely the more asymmetric firms are. 
where F i is fixed costs, and
denote the diversion ratio telling the fraction of diverted customers from product j that switches to product i because of a price increase of product j.
In general, optimal pre-and post-merger prices will differ. Ceteris paribus, a merger gives merging firms an incentive to increase prices, while efficiencies do the opposite. Gregory
Werden considered the necessary efficiencies (E i ) such that optimal post-merger prices were identical to the pre-merger prices.
3 In such case, the competitors would have no incentive to increase their prices either, whereby volumes would remain unchanged, and the analyst can neglect both competitor and demand data. 4 Werden developed the following condition
Rearranging (1) for i=1we get Werden's notion of UPP (compare FS-eq. (7)):
with a similar condition for i=2. FS define UPP as follows:
(2') is the correct expression for measuring the case of no upward pricing pressure as the feedback from the second product is incorporated. Lower marginal cost on one product implies that it is more profitable to pick up sales from the other product. This feedback effect will, all else equal, make it more profitable to raise prices after the merger. FS suggest using UPP 1 as the screen and argue that its basic economic logic is more transparent than introducing simultaneous equations (as eq (2') implies), and that it accords with their emphasis on simplicity and transparency.
Divide by P 2 in (3), transforming the screen into a unit-free measure, whereby the following condition signals an upward pricing pressure on product 1: Since 
Rearranging the condition, there will on average be an upward pricing pressure if: 
The right hand side of (6) is identical to the right hand side of (4'), whereby we can compare the left hand sides of (4') and (6). There is a larger scope for upward pricing pressure applying test (4') than test (6) if: 
Rearranging terms, we find that (7) Figure 1 where the solid line shows when condition (8) Figure 1 , the UPP 1 test in (4) indicates an upward pricing pressure while the accurate test in (2) does not. The intuition is that unequal diversion ratios D 12 and D 21 lead to different incentives to raise each of the two prices. There can be an upward pricing pressure on the product with a large diversion ratio and a downward pricing pressure on the product with the low diversion ratio. Combining the two, one may find that on average there is no upward pricing pressure. In contrast, there will be an upward pricing pressure if we allow for a price change on only the product with the large diversion ratio. Applying the UPP 1 test on the product with the largest diversion ratio can therefore lead to a false positive. This is in line with the proposed procedure in FS. If there are mixed results, UPP 1 > 0 while UPP 2 < 0, the advice is to scrutinize this merger further. By doing so there is a risk of going along with some false positives. However, the subsequent full inquiry is then expected to clear a case where the screening led to a false positive. The costs of false positive tests in the screening phase will then be limited.
Unequal diversion ratios are often the case where one product has lower sales than the other.
9
A large fraction of customers from the smaller product will be diverted to the larger product, while the small product only picks up a small fraction of customers diverted from the large product. Thus, after the merger there is a stronger incentive to raise the price on the small product than on the large product. , where v is the market share dependent weight on product 1. Apart from v, UPP w has 8 parameters: ,2, and D 12 and D 21 . By taking ratios these are reduced to four parameters:
Now we can compute border-lines for false positive in various two-dimensional spaces in the following way: Consider product 1 and find parameter-values that make UPP 1 > 0, while at the same time make UPP w < 0. An efficiency gain E reduces any UPP, see eqs.
(1) and (2).
Thus we seek the smallest E 1 that makes UPP 1 > 0, and the largest E 2 that makes UPP w < 0.
In sum, we seek the smallest e ≡ E 1 /E 2 .
Return to Figure 1 
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
The UPP framework has been presented as a very useful tool for screening mergers. One concern is that the specific UPP test proposed by Farrell and Shapiro, called the UPP 1 test, is biased towards giving false negatives. This is problematic for a test used for screening, since it could clear anti-competitive mergers. In this article we have shown that, contrary to what has been claimed, the test can lead to false positives. This will be true if the merging firms are sufficiently asymmetric, for example asymmetries in diversion ratios in each direction between the two merging firms' products.
This result illustrates that the specific test provided by Farrell and Shapiro is less problematic for a screening purpose then earlier indicated. On the other hand, a false positive is more problematic in the full fledge analysis of the anti-competitive effect of a merger since then it is less likely that the error is corrected later on. It is thus more problematic than earlier indicated to apply this test in the second phase of a merger procedure. There are thus good reasons for applying the proposed UPP test only for screening purposes. 
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